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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Aprophe ("Aprophe") and the Federal Republic of
Rantania ("Rantania") hereby submit the present dispute to the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court's Statute,
in accordance with the Compromis for submission to the I.C.J. of the
differences concerning the Mai-Tocao Temple, signed in The Hague, The
Netherlands, on the twelfth day of September in the year two thousand and
eleven. Both States have accepted the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to
Article 36(1) of its Statute and Article XXV of the Peace Agreement of
1965.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Andler regime and its representatives can appear
before this Court in the name of Aprophe.
2. Whether the use of force against Aprophe in the context of
Operation Uniting for Democracy is attributable to Rantania, and
whether that use of force was illegal.
3. Whether the exercise of jurisdiction by Rantanian courts in the
case of Turbando, et al., v. The Republic of Aprophe was
consistent with International Law.
4. Whether Aprophe violated international law by destroying a
building of the Temple of Mai-Tocao.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
Rantania maintains close diplomatic and trade relations with
neighboring countries Lamarthia, Verland, and Pellegrinia. Aprophe is a
state on Rantania's immediate west. The Mai-Tocao temple complex,
located in Aprophe near the Rantanian-Aprophian border, is a world-
renowned cultural site, with a history dating to 2500 BCE. Ancient
historians wrote about its significance to multiple cultures. Mai-Tocao
attracts over 500,000 tourists annually, and is central to Aprophian and
Rantanian cultural heritage. In 1986, Aprophe proposed, with Rantania's
strong support, that Mai-Tocao be inscribed on the World Heritage List.
This happened in 1988.
In 1962, Aprophe and Rantania engaged in a war over Mai-Tocao and
its surrounding territory. During this Mai-Tocao War, the Aprophian army
occupied undisputed Rantanian territory, subjecting more than 500
Rantanian peasants-so-called "military internees"-to forced labor
without compensation in daily 12-hour shifts.
In 1965, the two states engaged negotiated and concluded a Peace
Agreement, which submitted the boundary dispute to arbitration. The
arbitral tribunal awarded all disputed territory, including Mai-Tocao, to
Aprophe.
In 1980, Rantania, Lamarthia, Verland, and Pellegrinia concluded the
Eastern Nations Charter of Human Rights ("Charter"), which established
the Eastern Nations Court ("ENC"). In 1990, they created the Eastern
Nations International Organization ("ENI") to strengthen their economic
and political ties. The constituent treaty contains a mutual defense pact and
incorporates the Charter by reference.
In 2000, Aprophian Senator Mig Green was elected President by the
largest margin of votes in Aprophe's history. His campaign platform
proposed joining the ENI. From 2001 to 2006, Green's government
implemented pro-ENI policies to meet preconditions for ENI membership.
Aprophe acceded to the Charter in 2005, with an exemption from the
ENC's compulsory jurisdiction.
The Turbando Case
In 2001, the International League for Solidarity and Access ("ILSA")
instituted proceedings against Aprophe in an Aprophian court on behalf of
60 former military internees, raising claims of forced, uncompensated labor
during the Mai-Tocao War. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the case due to Aprophe's statute of limitations.
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ILSA subsequently instituted similar proceedings in Rantania. The
case was initially dismissed based on Article XV in the 1965 Peace
Agreement, but the ENC held that Rantania could not rely upon this clause
to bar the suit. On remand in 2009, the trial court denied immunity to
Aprophe and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. Aprophe did not
participate in or appeal these proceedings, but maintained that the
Rantanian decision violated Aprophe's sovereign immunity and the Peace
Agreement. The trial court granted an indefinite stay of enforcement,
reviewable upon either party's petition.
In 2011, ILSA successfully moved to lift the stay, and bailiffs seized
US$10,000,000 worth of Aprophe's non-diplomatic property located in
Rantania, consistent with Rantanian law. Rantanian judicial authorities
currently hold the property.
The Coup
The Rantanian court's decision in Turbando strengthened opposition
to Green's pro-ENI policies. However, a poll conducted by Aprophe's
Office for National Statistics indicated that a majority of Aprophians
approved of Green's policies and pro-ENI efforts.
Green declared his candidacy for a third term. However, on January
10, 2011, following some civil unrest, he invoked constitutional powers to
postpone the elections for one year, and ordered the Aprophian military to
begin armed patrols.
On January 15, General Paige Andler, the Aprophian military Chief-
of-Staff, wrote an open letter refusing to obey Green's orders. On January
16, armed soldiers loyal to Andler forcibly entered the Presidential Palace
and other government installations. President Green and members of his
government fled to Rantania. Andler proclaimed herself "interim
president" of Aprophe, establishing control over most of the population and
the territory.
Two days later, facing widespread and growing opposition to her
government, Andler declared a state of emergency and dissolved
parliament. She assured Aprophians that their civil rights would be
respected and that elections would be called soon. To date, elections have
not been called.
Forty Aprophian Ambassadors, including those to the United Nations
("UN") and the Netherlands, renounced Andler and declared allegiance to
Green. Approximately 800 members of the National Homeland Brigade
remained loyal to Green and established bases in two villages, to which
hundreds of Green supporters migrated. Andler ordered over 2,000
heavily-armed members of the Quick Reactionary Forces ("QRF") to
2012]
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confront the Brigade. Small-scale fighting commenced on January 20,
continuing over the next three weeks.
Many countries condemned Andler's assault upon the pro-Green units.
On January 22, the ENI Council unanimously passed a resolution
introduced by Rantania, recognizing Green as the lawful president and
condemning Andler's coup. The UN General Assembly adopted a
resolution by an overwhelming majority, condemning the coup and urging
the Security Council to intervene. All ENI members and 27 other nations
formally announced that they would conduct relations only with Green's
government. To date, only 14 nations recognize Andler's regime.
Andler denounced the ENI Council resolution as an unjustifiably
interference in Aprophe's internal affairs, and the interim foreign affairs
minister informed the UN Secretary-General that Aprophe was denouncing
the Eastern Nations Charter.
Operation Uniting for Democracy
On February 10, the QRF launched artillery strikes against the two
villages loyal to Green. One hundred forty people were killed and hundreds
were wounded in three days. QRF commanders indicated their immediate
intention to enter the villages. Green urged the ENI Council to take steps to
"prevent an imminent humanitarian crisis."
The ENI Council unanimously approved "Activation Orders" for air
strikes against military assets used to threaten civilians and perpetuate
Andler's illegal regime. Rantanian Major-General Brewscha was appointed
as Force Commander to make all operational decisions under the direction
of the ENI Defense Committee. The ENI launched the operation on
February 18, with the Rantanian air force playing a major role, conducting
air strikes against verified military installations in Marcelux, Aprophe's
capital.
The operation destroyed 12 of 15 military installations near Marcelux
and killed 50 Aprophian soldiers, with no civilian casualties and only
incidental damage to non-military buildings. A military think-tank reported
that the operation effectively destroyed Aprophe's military.
On March 1, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution
condemning Operation Uniting for Democracy for failing to provide
advance notice pursuant to the UN Charter. The campaign continued until
the ENI council formally the operation on March 5.
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The Destruction of a Mai-Tocao Building
On February 27, Andler fled to Mai-Tocao. Brewscha announced that,
rather than risking damage to Mai-Tocao by striking Andler's headquarters
there, ENI ground forces would enter Aprophe and capture Andler. Andler
publicly threatened to destroy a Mai-Tocao building every other day as long
as the ENI operation continued.
When the air strikes continued, Andler blew up a building in Mai-
Tocao on March 3, destroying almost half of it. The World Heritage
Committee issued a press release calling the destruction "tragic."
Rantanian President Perego condemned it a breach of international law and
ordered an immediate grounding of Rantania's air force.
Submission Before the International Court of Justice ("I.C.J.")
Without prejudice to Rantania's contention that the Andler regime is
illegitimate and cannot represent Aprophe before the Court, both parties
jointly submitted the dispute to the I.C.J.-Aprophe as Applicant, Rantania
as Respondent.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Andler's Governmental Illegitimacy
The Andler government cannot represent Aprophe before this Court
because Andler is not the legitimate head of state. Only legitimate
governments can bind states in contentious international disputes. Andler
has not received the international recognition that this Court in Genocide
held is necessary to gain legitimacy.
Alternatively, Andler violated the Aprophian people's right to
participatory governance. If democratic governance has not crystallized as
customary international law, then Andler's government is still illegitimate
because it does not reflect popular sovereignty. Finally, Andler never
established sufficient effective control to garner legitimacy. Even if Andler
has effective control, this presumption of legitimacy is rebutted by
democratic expression.
Alternatively, the Green government is a legitimate government-in-
exile with the exclusive ability to bind the Aprophian state in these
proceedings.
Attributability to Rantania and Legality of Operation Uniting for
Democracy
As the Eastern Nations International Organization ("ENI") is an
international organization with a separate and independent legal
personality, Operation Uniting for Democracy can only be attributable to
the ENI and not to Rantania. This is the case whether this Court applies
either a test of "ultimate authority and control" or of "effective control."
ENI had "ultimate authority and control" because the operation was
commanded by an ENI designated force commander and was directed by
the ENI Defense Committee. Furthermore, as Applicant can provide no
evidence that Rantania directed, controlled or interfered with any specific
conduct of the forces placed at the ENI's disposal, the ENI also had
"effective control" of any acts in which the alleged violations occurred.
Even if Rantania is found to be secondarily or concurrently
responsible, the subject matter of this dispute involves the rights and
obligations of the ENI, Lamarthia, Verland and Pellegrinia. Therefore, in
accordance with the long-held Monetary Gold principle, the Court must
decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
In any event, the use of force against Aprophe was not internationally
wrongful because Aprophe both requested and consented to the use of
force. As Mig Green's government was the legitimate government of
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Aprophe, it was empowered under international law to request foreign
military assistance, even absent Security Council authorization.
Sovereign Immunity
Rantania's court lawfully exercised jurisdiction in the case of
Turbando v. Aprophe, because state practice on immunity does not establish
a customary international law prohibition on the lifting of immunity forjus
cogens violations. The Lotus principle permits Rantania to recognize ajus
cogens exception to immunity in the absence of such a prohibition.
Aprophe violated the jus cogens prohibition on forced labor and
slavery by subjecting more than 500 Rantanians to forced labor during the
Mai-Tocao war. Aprophe has failed to take any step to provide the victims
of its illegal acts with any remedy, even fifty years later. The Rantanian
court may consider the peremptory nature of the norms violated, as well as
Aprophe's failure to provide redress, when denying immunity, particularly
in light of the victims' right of access to justice. Becausejus cogens norms
are hierarchically superior to rules on state immunity, they override
immunity rules in cases of conflict. Aprophe also waived its sovereign
immunity defense by violating ajus cogens norm.
Destruction of Cultural Property
Since Andler exercised elements of governmental authority after
forcing the rightful Green government into exile, her unlawful actions are
attributable to Aprophe. Andler's destruction of a building in Mai-Tocao,
an important cultural site, constituted an illegal act of hostility directed
against cultural property. Far from discharging its responsibility to protect
cultural property in its territory, Aprophe willfully destroyed a building in
Mai-Tocao as a political measure to coerce the ENI into ceasing its
operation. There is no evidence of imperative military necessity to justify
destroying the Mai-Tocao building, particularly because Mai-Tocao is
wholly unconnected to the events giving rise to ENI's operation.
Furthermore, Andler unlawfully made Mai-Tocao a military objective by
entering it and using it as a shield from ENI forces. Thus, even if there was
imperative military necessity, Andler contributed to the situation of
necessity and cannot be permitted to invoke the defense.
Lastly, the destruction of cultural property was an illegal act of
reprisal, prohibited by customary international law without any exception of
military necessity.
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PLEADINGS
I. THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICANT'S CLAIMS,
SINCE THE ANDLER REGIME AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES CANNOT APPEAR
BEFORE THIS COURT IN THE NAME OF APROPHE
A. This Court should defer to the international community's determination
that Andler's government is illegitimate
Only a legitimate government may bind a state in international law.'
Therefore, this Court may only exercise jurisdiction over claims submitted
by the legitimate government of a state.2 The General Assembly's power to
pursue dispute resolution 3 and recommend the codification and progressive
development of international law4 renders that body the most competent
international institution to make legitimacy determinations.5
In the Genocide case, this Court deferred to the General Assembly and
the international community in determining that Bosnian president Alija
Izetbegovic was the legitimate representative of the Bosnian government,
noting that the Izetbegovic government had been seated by the General
Assembly and had been signatories to international treaties.6 Likewise, in
the Anastasiou case, the European Court of Justice deferred to the European
Union and its members' position that the Clerides government was the sole
legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus in finding that only the
Clerides government was empowered to issue agricultural certificates.7
Similarly, courts regularly defer to their executive branches for legitimacy
determinations in the domestic context.8
1. Jean D'Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U J.
INT'L L. & POL. 877, 878 (2006) [hereinafter "D'Aspremont, Democracy"].
2. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Her. v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 1, 44 [hereinafter "Genocide,
Preliminary Objections"]; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 STAT. 1055 (1945), art.34(1).
3. Charter of the United Nations, I U.N.T.S. XVI (1945), art.14 [hereinafter "U.N. Charter"].
4. Id, art.13(a)(1).
5. BRAD ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 258-9 (2000)
[hereinafter "ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY"] . See also Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military
Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 B.Y.I.L. 189, 199 (1986) [hereinafter "Doswald-
Beck"].
6. Genocide, Preliminary Objections.
7. Stefan Talmon, The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, 12 E.J.I.L.
727, 736 (2001).
8. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 373 (5th ed.
2009) [hereinafter "DAMROSCH"].
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Only fourteen countries have recognized Andler's regime.9 Further,
Aprophe's U.N. ambassador has remained loyal to President Green, 10 and
there is no indication that the General Assembly's Credentials Committee
has considered seating a rival Andler delegation. Moreover, the General
Assembly has condemned the Andler regime by an overwhelming majority
vote." Through these actions, the international community has
affirmatively denied the legitimacy of Andler's regime.
This Court should follow the established practice of courts and defer to
the international community's rejection of the legitimacy of Andler's
government, which would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear
Aprophe's claims.
B. Andler's government is illegitimate because it came to power in
violation of the principle ofpolitical participation
Even if this Court declines to defer to the international community, it
should independently determine that Andler's government is illegitimate
because it came to power through non-participatory means and is non-
democratic.
In the early 1990's, state practice signaled the emergence of a "right to
political participation" or a "right to democratic governance" in
international law. 12 Under this norm, governments derive their legitimacy
from the extent to which they come to power through participatory political
mechanisms. 3 Recent state practice in response to non-democratic coups
in Madagascar 14 and Honduras 5 demonstrates that this norm has
crystallized in customary international law.
16
The norm of political participation is rooted in a number of
multilateral instruments. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR") provides every citizen with the right to take
9. Compromis 31.
10. Compromis 29.
II. Compromis 33.
12. Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 539 (1992); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 A.J.I.L. 46 (1992)
[hereinafter "Franck"].
13. Franck, 46.
14. Brad Roth, Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of
the Effective Control Doctrine, I I MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 37, 46 (2010) [hereinafter "Roth, Coups"].
15. G.A. Res. 63/301, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/301 (2009).
16. Jean D'Aspremont, The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: A
Reply to Susan Marks, 22 E.J.I.L. 549, 569 (2011) [hereinafter "D'Aspremont, Reply"]; IAN CLARK,
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 176 (2007); Ben Chiagara, The Right to Democratic
Entitlement: Time for Change?, 8 MEDITERRANEAN J. H.R. 53 (2004).
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part in the public affairs of the state,17 which has been interpreted to provide
the right to challenge the government. 18  For example, the European
Commission of Human Rights interpreted similar language in the European
Convention on Human Rights to condemn the Greek junta's elimination of
political parties. 19 Likewise, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights interpreted similar language in the American Convention on Human
Rights to affirm the citizenry's right to be free from coercion when making
electoral decisions.2 °
More specifically, article 1 of the ICCPR grants all people the right to
freely determine their political status.21 This right has been interpreted by
many states to require democratic government. 22 Accordingly, states have
organized around participatory principles.23 As of 2000, 106 states had
pledged to resist the overthrow of democratic systems.24 Moreover, non-
democratic states now claim legitimacy not by challenging the democratic
order but by attempting to credibly claim democratization.25
Andler's regime violated the norm of political participation and
democratic governance by overthrowing President Green's democratically-
elected government in a coup. 26 Although Andler has pledged to hold new
elections,27 she has made no effort to do so. Thus, because Andler's regime
came to power in violation of the principles of political participation and
democratic governance, it is illegitimate under international law and is not
entitled to represent Aprophe before this Court.
C. Andler's government is illegitimate because it has not received the
consent of the Aprophian people
If this Court finds that the norms of democratic governance and
political participation have not yet crystallized in customary international
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), art.25
[hereinafter "ICCPR"]; H.R.C., General Comment 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.7 (1996);
Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 20, 23 (2001) [hereinafter
"Rich"].
18. ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 336.
19. The Greek Case, Y.B. EUR. CONV. H.R. 179, 180 (1969).
20. Mexico Elections Decisions, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.LJV/1 1.77/doc.7/rev.l (1990), 97, 108.
21. ICCPR, art. 1.
22. Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51 I.C.L.Q.
225,231 (2002)
23. Franck, 47.
24. Rich, 30.
25. D'Aspermont, Reply, 556.
26. Compromis 15.
27. Compromis 28.
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law, the applicable rule for the determination of a government's legitimacy
is popular sovereignty, which has been the governing standard in
international law for at least the past century28 and is supported by multiple
General Assembly resolutions and international conventions.2 9 Unlike the
principles of political participation and democratic governance, popular
sovereignty does not require a democratic form of government. 30 However,
popular sovereignty requires that every legitimate government enjoy the
consent of the governed.1  While a government's effective control
establishes a presumption of legitimacy, that presumption may be rebutted
by election results that demonstrate the true political will of the people.
32
1. Andler's government is not entitled to a presumption of legitimacy
because it does not exercise effective control over Aprophe
a. President Green's government exercises effective control over Aprophe
Established governments enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy in
international law.33 The international community has frequently recognized
the legitimacy of established governments even when insurgents control
most of a state's territory.34 Because President Green's government was
indisputably the established government of Aprophe before Andler's coup,
Andler's regime will not enjoy a presumption of effective control until
President Green's government no longer has any "fighting chance" of
reclaiming control of the country.35
The situation in Aprophe has not reached this point, as Green's forces
have not succumbed to persistent attacks by the Andler regime's military. 6
As a result, President Green's government enjoys the presumption of
28. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220-21 (Anders Wedburg trans.
1961); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art.21
[hereinafter "UDHR"].
29. UDHR; U.N. Charter, preamble; United Nations Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); ICCPR, arts. 1, 3;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966), arts. 1, 3.
30. Roth, ILLEGITIMACY, 150.
31. Id. 142.
32. Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law, 16 MAX
PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS 40 (2008) [hereinafter "Petersen"];
D'Aspremont, Democracy, 903.
33. Roth, ILLEGITIMACY, 151.
34. Id. 132 (describing continued international recognition of governments in Angola 1975-95,
Cambodia 1970-75, Biafra 1967-70, Eritrea 1970s-90s).
35. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (1947) [hereinafter
"LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION"]; ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 151.
36. Compromis 30.
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effective control over Aprophe. Therefore, Andler's government is not
entitled to any presumption of legitimacy.
b. In the alternative, neither Andler nor President Green's government
exercises effective control over Aprophe
Effective control is not binary, as the Credentials Committee has
recognized on multiple occasions. In 1997, when rival governments split
control over Cambodia, the Committee declined to seat any delegation until
elections resolved the dispute.37 Similarly, in 2010, the Committee declined
to seat any delegation from Madagascar.38 In 1994, the Security Council
noted that because a power vacuum existed in Somalia, no regime could
bind that state in international law.39
Andler's ability to control the country decreased dramatically since the
coup. Her military was effectively destroyed by February 2011.40
Meanwhile, President Green's supporters hold territory in northern
Aprophe, and it appears as though the Andler regime has lost its ability to
dislodge them from their strongholds,41 indicating that neither government
exercises effective control over the country. As a result, Andler's
government is not entitled to any presumption of legitimacy based on
effective control.
2. In the alternative, popular support for President Green's government
rebuts any presumption of legitimacy Andler's government derives from its
effective control of Aprophe
Even if Andler's government does maintain effective control over
Aprophe, that control merely establishes a rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy.42 Where an election demonstrates the true political will of the
people, the election's results rebut that presumption because the consent of
the governed determines a government's legitimacy.43 Exceptions to the
effective control doctrine's presumption, including for foreign military
intervention and racist minority governments, demonstrate that the
underlying test for governmental legitimacy is popular sovereignty. 44
37. RoTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 393.
38. Roth, Coups, 46.
39. Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council resolution
885, U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (1994), 131.
40. Compromis 39-40.
41. Compromis 34, 38.
42. ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 2, 30; Mokotso v. King Moshoeshoe 11 (1988), 90 I.L.R. 427, 494
(1990) (Lesotho High Ct.).
43. Petersen, 40; D'Aspremont, Democracy, 903.
44. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION 348; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
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States in Europe,45 the African Union,46 the Americas,47 and the
Commonwealth48 have explicitly endorsed popular sovereignty as the
standard for governmental legitimacy. Democratically-elected
governments ousted in coups d'etat, such as in Haiti, 49 Liberia,50 Sierra
Leone,5' Honduras,52 and Madagascar,53 have been recognized as the sole
legitimate governments of their respective states, despite their lack of
effective control. Additionally, where the democratic process has been
disregarded, such as in Angola,5 4 Cambodia,55 and Myanmar,56 states have
refused to recognize the resultant government.
In 2000, Mig Green was elected President with the largest majority in
Aprophian electoral history.57 The most recent polls indicate that 55% of
Aprophians approve of his government and 60% support his efforts to join
the ENI. 58 The only groups opposing President Green-labor unions and
nationalists-represent special interests whose opinions are not reflective of
Aprophian society. 59 By contrast, Andler faced immediate "widespread and
growing opposition" when she seized power.60
President Green's government enjoys a clear mandate from the
Aprophian people, and is thus reflective of popular sovereignty. This
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S. W. Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16; East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90.
45. O.S.C.E., Document for the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing
Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact Finding,
30 I.L.M. 1670 (1991); O.S.C.E., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension, 29 1.L.M. 1305 (1990), art.1(3).
46. Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 (2000), arts.3-4.
47. Declaration of Santiago on Democracy and Public Trust: A New Commitment to Good
Governance for the Americas, AG/DEC.31 (XXXIII-O/03), OEA/Ser.P/XXXIII-O.2, vol. 1 (2003).
48. The Commonwealth, Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare
Declaration (1995).
49. Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Support to the Democratic Movement of
Haiti, MRE/RES.2/91, OEA/Ser.FN.1 (1991); ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 372; G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/7 (1991).
50. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992); ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 397.
51. ROTH, ILLEGITIMACY, 406; S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1132 (1997).
52. G.A. Res. 63/301, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/301 (2009).
53. Roth, Coups, 46.
54. S.C. Res. 811, U.N. Doc. S/RES/811 (1993); S.C. Res. 864, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (1993);
S.C. Res. 851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/851 (1993).
55. Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (1997), 5.
56. G.A. Res. 49/197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/197 (1994).
57. Compromis 14.
58. Compromis 23.
59. Compromis 15.
60. Compromis 28.
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rebuts any presumption of legitimacy that Andler's government might have
derived from effective control.
3. President Green's government is a legitimate government-in-exile
When a democratic regime is forced into exile, the deposed
government retains its legitimacy so long as it fulfills the criteria of a
legitimate government-in-exile. 61  State practice in response to anti-
democratic coups in Haiti,62 Sierra Leone,63 and Honduras 6 demonstrates
that this rule has attained customary status.
President Green's government fulfills all four criteria of a legitimate
government-in-exile, exclusively entitled to bind the state in international
law.65 It purports to represent a recognized state, Aprophe; 66 it purports to
represent a people, the Aprophian people;67 it is independent of its host,
Rantania;68 and the government in de facto control of the state, Andler's
government, is illegitimate because it does not represent the will of the
people.69
Green's government also satisfies the fourth criterion on alternative
grounds.70  This Court held in Nicaragua that it was possible for a
government to legally bind itself by treaty to democratic governance. 7' In
2005, Aprophe did so by acceding to the Eastern Nations Charter of Human
Rights ("EN Charter"),72 reaffirming Aprophe's commitment to democracy
and undertaking to adopt "legislative or other measures necessary" to
ensure personal liberty and social justice within a democratic framework.73
By seizing power in violation of Aprophe's treaty commitment to maintain
61. Edward Collins, Jr. et al., Regime Legitimation in Instances of Coup-Caused
Governments-in-Exile: The Cases of Presidents Makarios and Aristide, 5 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 199, 229
(1996).
62. Id.
63. Karsten Nowrot & Emily Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
321 (1998) [hereinafter "Nowrot"].
64. G.A. Res. 63/301, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/301 (2009).
65. Stefan Talmon, Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria
for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN HoNouR OF IAN BROWNLIE 499-537 (1999) [hereinafter "Talmon, Exile"].
66. Compromis 31.
67. Compromis 23.
68. Compromis 31.
69. See Part I(C)(2) supra.
70. Talmon, Exile.
71. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), Merits
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14. 392 [hereinafter "Nicaragua"].
72. Compromis 15.
73. Compromis, Annex II preamble, art.2.
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a democratic system of government, Andler's government became an
illegitimate in government in situ.
As a result, President Green's government fulfills the criteria for a
legitimate government-in-exile, and is thus the sole entity entitled to
represent Aprophe before this Court.
II. THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST APROPHE IN OPERATION UNITING FOR
DEMOCRACY IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO RANTANIA, AND IN ANY EVENT,
THAT USE OF FORCE WAS NOT ILLEGAL
A. The use offorce is attributable to the Eastern Nations International
Organization ("the ENI")
1. The ENI possesses independent international legal personality
International organizations possess legal personality separate from
their members, and are responsible for their own acts.74 In Reparations,
this Court provided two criteria to determine if an organization has
objective international legal personality.75
First, the organization's founding states must have intended to imbue
the organization with independent legal personality. 76 This is established as
the ENI Treaty provides for privileges and immunities for the organization
77 7in member states, creates independent ENI organs,78 and requires only a
simple majority for ENI Council decisions.79
Second, the organization must "in fact [be] exercising" independence
from its members. 80 This has been demonstrated by the ENI's actions,
including its collective decision to take military action 81 and the Eastern
Nations Court's ("ENC") reversal of the judgment in the case of Turbando,
74. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 [hereinafter "Reparations"]; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2005)
[hereinafter "CASSESE, LAW"]; PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 475-479 (2009) [hereinafter "BOwETT"]; MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 260,
1311 (2008) [hereinafter "SHAW"].
75. Reparations, 179, 185; CASSESE, LAW, 137; Draft Articles of Responsibility of
International Organizations, Y.B.I.L.C., vol.11 (Part Two) (2011), art.2 cmt. 9 [hereinafter "DARIO"];
Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations: Do Their
Capacities Really Depend Upon the Conventions Establishing Them?, 34 NORDISK TIDSKRIFT FOR
INTERNATIONAL RET 1 (1964), 99 (1964) [hereinafter "Seyersted, Objective"]; SHAW, 1298.
76. Reparations, 179.
77. Id.; Compromis, Annex HI art.84.
78. Reparations, 178; Compromis, Annex III arts.4-5, 62; Seyersted, Objective, 99.
79. Compromis, Annex III art.5; CASSESE, LAW, 137.
80. Reparations, 179.
81. Comprornis 35-37.
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et al., v. the Republic of Aprophe ("Turbando"), originally delivered by a
trial court in Rantania, one of its member states.82  Additionally,
organizations with structures and attributes similar to those of the ENI, such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are widely considered to possess
independent legal personality.83
Lastly, even if affirmative recognition of an organization's legal
personality by a non-member state is required, Aprophe recognized the
ENI's legal personality by acceding to the EN Charter and by taking steps
to become an ENI member.84
2. Operation Uniting for Democracy was an ENI operation
Rantanian Air Force units were seconded to the ENI for the duration of
Operation Uniting for Democracy. The ENI's responsibility for acts
undertaken by these units depends on whether it had either "ultimate
authority and control" over the operation,85 or "effective control" over the
specific conduct in question.86 The ENI is responsible for the operation
under either standard.
The ENI had ultimate authority and control over the operation because
all of the acts committed by the Rantanian Air Force units fell within the
ENI's mandate for the operation.87 Further, the ENI retained operational
command and control by directing the operation through its Defense
Committee.88
The ENI also exercised effective control over the operation. 89 Since
the Rantanian Air Force units were seconded to the ENI, Aprophe must
show evidence of actual Rantanian orders concerning or interfering with the
operation9" to demonstrate Rantania's responsibility. Aprophe must also
prove that Rantania gave "instructions ... in respect of each operation in
82. Compromis 19, Annex III art.10(2).
83. Branno v. Ministry of War, 22 I.L.R. 756 (1954) (It.); Mazzanti v. H.A.F.S.E. & Ministry
of Def, 22 I.L.R. 758 (1954) (It. Flor. Trib.); Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 IUS
GENTIUM 35, 36 (2005); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 678 (7th ed.
2008) [hereinafter "BROWNLIE"].
84. Compromis 14-15; BowETr, 480.
85. Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 45 E.H.R.R. 10, 134
(2007) [hereinafter "Behrami"]; Kasumaj v. Greece, E.C.H.R. 6974/05 (2007); Gajic v. Germany,
E.C.H.R., 31446/02 (2008); R (AI-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, (2007) U.K.H.L. 58, 55
(U.K.).
86. DARIO, art.7.
87. Behrami, 124-126; Compromis 35.
88. Behrami, 139; Compronis 35-37.
89. DARIO, art.7.
90. Behrami, 139.
[Vol. 19:1
Distinguished Brief
which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall
actions." 91
However, the ENI-designated Force Commander made all operational
decisions.92 There is no evidence that Rantanian organs instructed, guided,
or controlled any specific act in respect to any allegedly wrongful acts.93
Neither the size of Rantania's contribution to the ENI forces nor the Force
Commander's nationality permits a contrary conclusion.94
Further, Rantania's ability to ground its air force does not signify
effective control over the air strikes. 95 International organizations maintain
effective control over their operations even when states retain some degree
of control over individual units.96 In United Nations ("UN") peacekeeping
operations, troop-contributing nations "always retain the power to withdraw
their soldiers at any moment, 97 but this factor does not free the UN from
responsibility for acts the troops commit. Moreover, even after the
grounding of the Rantanian Air Force, the suspension of the operation as a
whole required action by the ENI Council.98
B. The use offorce is not attributable to both the ENI and Rantania
1. Rantania is not secondarily or concurrently responsible for Operation
Uniting for Democracy
Member states are not concurrently liable for acts attributable to
international organizations with separate legal personality.99 In the context
of a military intervention performed under the aegis of an international
organization, conduct is ordinarily not simultaneously attributable to troop-
91. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 400 [hereinafter
"Genocide, Judgment"]; Nicaragua, 115.
92. Compromis 35-37.
93. FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 411 (1966).
94. Behrami, 91.
95. Genocide, Judgment, 400; Nicaragua, 115; Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadi6
Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 E.J.I.L. 649, 667 (2007); Kjetil
Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The 'Ultimate Authority and Control' Test, 19
E.J.I.L. 510, 516 (2008).
96. DARIO, art.] cmt. l.
97. Venice Commission, Opinion on human rights in Kosovo: Possible establishment of
review mechanisms, 280/2004, CDL-AD 033, 14 (2004).
98. Compromis 43.
99. Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-Fulfilment by
International Organizations of Their Obligations Towards Third Parties, 66 Y.B. INST. INT'L L. 249,
257 (1995).
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contributing nations. 100 Since at all relevant times Rantanian units acted
under the ENI's auspices, the actions of those units correspondingly
"ceased to be attributable" to Rantania. 10'
2. In the alternative, the Court lacks jurisdiction as the ENI, Lamarthia,
Verland, and Pellegrinia constitute indispensable third parties
Even if Rantania was secondarily or concurrently responsible for the
actions of its Air Force, the Monetary Gold principle'0 2 would require that
this Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction because any decision on the
merits of this dispute would necessarily implicate the rights and obligations
of third parties, in this case Lamarthia, Verland, Pellegrinia, and the ENI.'03
The rights, obligations and responsibilities of these parties would form the
"very subject matter"' 4 and be a "pre-requisite"''0 5 of any decision
concerning wrongfulness on Rantania's part, as all relevant acts committed
by Rantania's organs were performed pursuant to decisions of the ENI
Council.
10 6
C. The use offorce was not illegal because Aprophe's legitimate
government consented to Operation Uniting for Democracy
The prohibition on the use of force contained in article 2(4) of the UN
Charter is not absolute. 0 7  As this Court held in Nicaragua, military
intervention "at the request of the [host] government" does not violate
international law,' 8 even absent Security Council authorization.'0 9
100. Behrami, 139; DARIO, art.7 cmt. 4 (noting that dual or multiple attribution would "not
frequently occur in practice").
101. Al-Jedda v. UK., E.C.H.R., 27021/08 (2011), 80.
102. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., US.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32
[hereinafter, "Monetary Gold'].
103. See preliminary objections of Portugal (145); France (29-35); Canada (22); Netherlands
( 7.2.17); Belgium ( 533); and U.K. ( 6.18) in the Legality of Use of Force cases before this Court;
Jean D'Aspremont, Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the
Responsibility of Member States, 4 INT'L. ORG. L. REV. 91, 117 (2007).
104. Monetary Gold, 32.
105. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austil.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
1992 I.C.J. 240, 55.
106. Compromis 35-37.
107. PHILIP JESSup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 162 (1948).
108. Nicaragua, 126; see also Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Y.B.I.L.C., vol.lI (Part Two) (2001), art.20 [hereinafter "ARSIWA"]; DARIO, art.20;
SHAW, 1313; David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent,
7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209,209 [hereinafter "Wippman"]; G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314
(1974), art.3(e); Doswald-Beck, 191.
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While only the state's legitimate representative in international law
may validly request another state's intervention, 10 President Green's
government was the only legitimate government of Aprophe when he
requested the ENI's intervention under any of the tests for governmental
legitimacy discussed supra. I1
Even if Andler's government exercises effective control over Aprophe
today, it had not established effective control before President Green
requested Rantania's assistance, as Green's government still had a "fighting
chance."' 12 Even more importantly, since Green's popular support rebuts
any presumption of legitimacy Andler could derive from her effective
control of Aprophe, any effective control Andler held could not have
prevented Green's ability to represent Aprophe, request assistance, or
consent to an intervention.'
13
Further, since Green's government was a legitimate government-in-
exile, it was empowered to provide valid consent." 4  Substantial state
practice supports the capacity of a legitimate government-in-exile to
consent to foreign military intervention."15 For example, even though the
transitional government of Somalia had little control over any state
territory, 1 6 it still had the capacity to validly consent to Ethiopia's
subsequent military intervention and assistance. 17  Additionally, the
Liberian and Sierra Leonean governments-in-exile had the capacity to
109. Jochen Frowein, Legal Consequences or International Law Enforcement in Case of
Security Council Inaction, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS,
NEW LAW 111, 120 (Jost Delbruck ed. 1993).
110. ARSIWA, art.20 cmts.4-6; Doswald-Beck, 251; Eighth Report on State Responsibility,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318, 2 Y.B.I.L.C. 3, 36 (1979); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 164
(2001).
111. See Part I supra.
112. See Part I(C)(1) supra.
113. Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the
Liberian Conflict, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 53, 603
(1993) [hereinafter "Nolte"]; Wippman, 209.
114. Doswald-Beck, 251 (describing the validity of consent of ineffective regimes in Congo
(1960) and Lebanon (1978)); Genocide, Preliminary Objections, 221-22; Matthew Saul, From Haiti to
Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in International Law, 11 INT'L
CMTY. L. REv. 119, 139 (2009) [hereinafter "Saul"]; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE 9 (2007) (noting that oral pronouncements can be legally binding).
115. Nowrot, 386; Nolte, 603; Monica Hakimi, To Condone or Condemn? Regional
Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council Authorization, 40 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 643, 666 (2007).
116. Saul, 146.
117. Id.; S.C. Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (2011).
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provide consent to interventions undertaken by the Economic Community
of West African States--consent that has been widely recognized as
valid. '1 8 Lastly, years after Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had
lost effective control of Haiti, the Security Council resolution authorizing
the use of force to restore his presidency specifically recognized the
legitimacy of his government and took special note of his request for
foreign military assistance.1 19
Because President Green's government was the sole legitimate
government of Aprophe when Green requested the ENI's intervention, his
request precluded the operation's wrongfulness.
III. RANTANIAN OFFICIALS MAY EXECUTE THE JUDGMENT IN TURBANDO
SINCE THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY RANTANIAN COURTS IN THAT
CASE WAS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Rantanian trial court's exercise of jurisdiction in Turbando was
fully consistent with international law, because the court had jurisdiction to
hear the case and was entitled to deny the application of foreign sovereign
immunity where Aprophe violated peremptory norms of international law
and did not compensate the victims.
This Court recognized in Arrest Warrant that a state must first
demonstrate jurisdiction before the question of immunities becomes
relevant.120 Rantanian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute in
Turbando based on the principle of territoriality,' 21 as Aprophe committed
the acts giving rise to the claims of the former military internees on
Rantanian territory. 1
22
A. Article XV of the 1965 Peace Agreement did not waive the claims of the
Rantanian former military internees
Article XV of the 1965 Peace Agreement purports to waive civil
claims by Rantanian nationals against Aprophe. 23 However, the claims of
the Rantanian military internees for human rights abuses cannot be waived,
because these claims stem from Aprophian violations of jus cogens
118. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. Doe. S/RES/788 (1992), 2; S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 162
(1998), 12.
119. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
120. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 46
[hereinafter "Arrest Warrant"].
121. SHAW, 579; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§402 (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT (THIRD)"].
122. Compromis 6.
123. Compromis, Annex I art.XV.
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norms. 2 4  Any treaty that bars compensation claims for a jus cogens
violation is void pursuant to articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties 25 because it frustrates the very purpose and realization
of that peremptory norm. 126
The Turbando claims allege violations of the peremptory prohibitions
on forced labor and slavery.127  In such cases alleging forced labor, the
prohibition on barring compensation claims for jus cogens violations
applies with even greater force, because the absence of due compensation
defines the norm's violation in the first place.1 28  Thus, a waiver of
compensation claims for forced labor would be tantamount to a waiver of
the peremptory prohibition on forced labor itself.
Furthermore, Aprophe has not provided any alternative means of
redressing its violations. Enforcement of Article XV with respect to
Aprophe's violations ofjus cogens norms would therefore leave the former
military internees without any compensation whatsoever. As a result,
Article XV cannot and does not waive the Turbando plaintiffs' forced labor
claims.
B. Sovereign immunity does not bar the claims of the former military
internees
Although a customary international norm of sovereign immunity
exists, it does not always entail exact prescriptions on how domestic courts
must give effect to this norm.' 29  As an area of international law that
developed principally from judicial state practice, 130 state practice has been
too inconsistent in their applications of immunity to establish rules more
specific than a general recognition of immunity and a broad set of
circumstances where it applies.' 3' States may thus apply immunity within
124. BROWNLIE, 514-16; V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 226 (1997);
Gay McDougall, Report of Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (1998), I58-60; Karen Parker & Jennifer Chew, Compensation for Japan's
World War H War-Rape Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 538 (1994).
125. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 (1969), arts.53, 64
(nullifying treaty provisions that conflict with a peremptory norm of international law, even if the norm
attainsjus cogens status after entry into force of the treaty).
126. Dinusha Panditaratne, Rights-Based Approaches to Examining Waiver Clauses in Peace
Treaties: Lessons from the Japanese Forced Labor Litigation in Californian Courts, 28 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 299, 315 (2005) [hereinafter "Panditaratne"].
127. See Part III(B)(2)(i) infra.
128. Panditaratne, 316.
129. CASSESE, LAW, 104; BROWNLIE, 330.
130. Report of the ILC on the work of its thiny-second session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10, 143 (1980)
[hereinafter "ILC Report, 1980"].
131. CASSESE, LAW, 104; BROWNLIE, 330.
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these broad limits set by international law, in accordance with the Lotus
principle. 132  In light of factors particular to the Turbando case, the
Rantanian court did not violate any international standard requiring the
application of sovereign immunity.
1. Rantania is entitled to apply sovereign immunity consistently with
developments in international law
There is no express international prohibition on denying sovereign
immunity for violations of jus cogens norms. Regional and domestic
judicial decisions that have found that no obligation to lift immunity forjus
cogens violations existed in international law, never held that states were
prohibited from denying immunity under such circumstances.133 In the
absence of any such prohibition, Rantania may apply rules on sovereign
immunity with due regard to developments in international human rights
law, avoiding an "artificial, unjust, and archaic" result. 134
The sovereign immunity doctrine is an exception to the dominant
principle of territorial jurisdiction,'35 developed to encourage international
comity. 136  Therefore, there is no inherent right of state immunity.1
37
Practical considerations guide domestic courts in their immunity analyses,
balancing sovereign equality against factors such as the rights of their own
citizens.138 This allows national courts to apply sovereign immunity in a
manner that better reflects evolving inter-state relationships.
39
132. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) No.10, 46.
133. See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. UK, E.C.H.R., 35763/97 (2001), 61 [hereinafter "AI-Adsani"];
Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, E.C.H.R., 50021/00 (2002). Since Aprophe's forced labor violations were
committed in Rantania, the Bouzari judgment may also be distinguished as it upheld state immunity for
jus cogens violations committed "outside the forum state." See Bouzari v. Iran, 220 O.A.C. 1, 93-95
(2004) (Can. Ont. Ct. App.).
134. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
B.Y.I.L. 220, 221 (1951) [hereinafter "Lauterpacht, Immunities"].
135. Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 167 RECUEIL DES
CouRs 113, 215 (1980) [hereinafter "Sinclair"]; BROWNLIE, 321; Lauterpacht, Immunities, 229; GAMAL
MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 11 (1984).
136. ILC Report, 1980, 58; Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (U.S.
Sup.Ct.); Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (U.S.); Buck v. Attorney-General [1965] Ch. 745,
770-71 (U.K. Ct. App.).
137. Lee Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights andJus Cogens, 97 A.J.I.L 741, 771 (2003);
Sinclair, 215 ("one does not start from an assumption that immunity is the norm, and that exceptions to
the rule of immunity have to be justified").
138. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (1984) (U.S. Ct.
App.).
139. Arrest Warrant, Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal,
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For example, states were able to respond to the growing participation
of governments in commercial transactions with private persons by
restricting the doctrine of immunity, which had hitherto been absolute,
140
and distinguishing between sovereign acts and commercial acts. 141 As tort
law developed, states have also denied sovereign immunity for tortious acts
committed by foreign states in the prosecuting state's territory. 142 Recently,
the U.S. created a terrorism exception to immunity in civil suits, reflecting
growing concerns over the threat of terrorism. 143  These examples
demonstrate that national court decisions and legislation, guided by
considerations of comity, drive the progressive development of the
international law governing immunities. Therefore, since no inherent right
of state immunity exists for jus cogens violations, Rantania is entitled to
consider the growing importance of human rights in international law and
deny immunity to Aprophe.' 44
2. Factors support Rantania's denial of immunity in Turbando
It is significant that Aprophe has not provided redress for the victims
of the Aprophian military's forced labor crimes. Since the purpose of
immunity is not to grant impunity, 145 state immunity affords an opportunity
for the defendant state to provide the remedies itself to comply with
international norms. 146 It cannot be abused to bar access to justice in the
context ofjus cogens violations. 147
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized access to
justice as a peremptory norm when the substantive rights violated were also
jus cogens.148  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
140. BROWNLIE, 327-29; SHAW, 701; DAMROSCH, 859; Sinclair, 210-13.
141. 1 Congreso del Partido [1983] A.C. 244, 267 (U.K.); Claims Against the Empire of Iran,
45 I.L.R. 57, 80 (1963) (Ger.); U.S. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada (Re Canada Labour Code), 94
I.L.R. 264, 278 (1992) (Can.); Reid v. Republic of Nauru, 101 I.L.R. 193, 195-96 (1993) (Austl. Vict.
Sup. Ct.); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (1985) (U.S. Ct. App.).
142. Christoph Schreuer, Some Recent Developments on the Law of State Immunity, 2 COMP. L.
Y.B. 215 (1978); Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/38 Annex (2004), art.12; European Convention on State Immunity, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972),
art.1 1; U.K. State Immunity Act, 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978), §5; U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) [hereinafter "FSIA"]; Prefecture of Voiolia v. Germany, Case 11/2000 (2000) (Gr.)
(applying the tort exception to immunity to proceedings for war damage).
143. FSIA, §1605A.
144. Compromis 120.
145. Arrest Warrant, 60.
146. Hazel Fox, State Immunity and the International Crime of Torture, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 142
(2006) [hereinafter "Fox"].
147. Redress Trust, Immunity v. Accountability (2005), 43.
148. Goiburd v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Merits Judgment, Series C-153 (2006), 131.
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Yugoslavia ("ICTY") has also recognized the possibility that victims ofjus
cogens violations could bring civil claims before foreign states' courts.
14 9
Further, Rantania is obliged to provide redress for the former military
internees, particularly since Aprophe has not done so, under article 13 of
the EN Charter, as the ENC held in its January 2009 judgment. 150
a. Sovereign immunity may be lifted for Aprophe's violations of thejus
cogens prohibition on forced labor
During the Mai-Tocao War, "more than 500 Rantanian peasants were
forced to labor" for the Aprophian army in daily 12-hour shifts. 151 This
treatment constituted forced labor,5 2 a modern variant of slavery and ajus
cogens violation.1 3 The definition of slavery contained in the 1926 Slavery
Convention, 5 4 supplemented by the 1930 Forced Labour Convention and
the 1956 Supplementary Convention on Slavery,' 55 includes forced labor.
Thus, the Turbando claims arise out of violations of the jus cogens
prohibition on slave labor.'
156
The presence of jus cogens norms violations in Turbando has
important consequences. Under article 41 of the Articles on State
Responsibility (ASR), states are obliged to not recognize a situation created
by serious breaches of peremptory norms as lawful.'
Moreover, the peremptory nature of Aprophe's breach takes primacy
over rules on sovereign immunity in cases of conflict. There is a normative
conflict between sovereign immunity and violations of peremptory norms
because the invocation of immunity will impede the latter's
149. Prosecutor v. Furundifya, Trial Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T (1998), 155.
150. Compromis 19, Annex II art.13.
151. Compromis 6.
152. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (1970) , art.2.1
[hereinafter "Forced Labour Convention"].
153. ILO, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma) (1998), 538; Ferrini v. Germany, n.5044
(2004) (It.) [hereinafter "Ferrini"]; John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (2002) (U.S. Ct. App.).
See also UDHR; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (1945), art.6 (making forced labor a war crime); BROWNLIE, 515;
Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 A.J.1.L. 1 (1986); Sarah Cleveland,
Norm Internalization and US. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (2001) (reading the
prohibition against slavery to include the prohibition against forced labor).
154. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (1926), art. 1.1.
155. Forced Labour Convention, art.2.1; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956), art. 1.
156. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33-34
[hereinafter "Barcelona Traction"]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and
Obligatio Ergo Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), §702.
157. ARSIWA, art.41(2).
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enforceability. 158  To dismiss the Turbando case on sovereign immunity
grounds would deprive the former military internees of their only available
means of redress for their suffering. 159 Since the rules on state immunity
conflict with a hierarchically higherjus cogens norm, the procedural bar of
immunity must be lifted. 160  This jus cogens exception to immunity was
applied by the Italian Supreme Court in Ferrini,16' and has found support
among members of this Court,162 national judges, 163 and academics. 164
Besides, Aprophe impliedly waived its immunity defense by violating
a.jus cogens norm. Aprophe cannot claim the privilege of immunity for
acts that violatejus cogens prohibitions, because international law does not
and cannot bestow immunity for acts it has universally criminalized .
65
Therefore, the Rantanian court correctly recognized that the acts
underlying the Turbando claims werejus cogens violations that allowed the
court to deny immunity and lawfully exercise jurisdiction. 66  This
interpretation of immunity reflects the growing importance of international
human rights law in the conduct of inter-state relations.
lV. APROPHE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DESTROYING A
BUILDING OF THE TEMPLE OF MAI-TOCAO
The Mai-Tocao temple complex is undisputedly a site of "outstanding
universal value.' 67  It is one of the most famous religious and
archaeological sites in the world, attracting over 500,000 tourists
158. Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and the Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of
Lords Got It Wrong, 18 E.J.I.L. 955, 957 (2007).
159. The military internees' claims have already been brought before Aprophian courts, but
were dismissed in 2002. Compromis 17.
160. Al-Adsani, Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflisch, Costa, Wildhaber, Cabral
Barreto and Vajic, 3.
161. Ferrini, I9, 9.1, affirmed in Italy v. Milde, n.1072 (2009) (It.).
162. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant, Dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, 7; id, Dissenting
opinion ofJudge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, 157-159.
163. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3),
[2000] A.C. 147, 278 (U.K.); Lozano v. Italy, n.31171/2008 (2009), §6 (It.).
164. Fox, 152; Andrea Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to Violations of Human Rights, 46
AUST. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 195 (1994) [hereinafter "Bianchi"]; Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture
as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15
E.J.I.L. 94 (2004); Kate Parlett, Immunity in Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging Exception, 1
E.H.R.L.R. 49, 51 (2006); Robert Taylor, Pinochet, Confusion, and Justice: The Denial of Immunity in
U.S. Courts to Alleged Torturers Who Are Former Heads of State, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 101, 114
(2001).
165. Bianchi, 240.
166. Compromis 20.
167. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1037
U.N.T.S. 151 (1972), art.l [hereinafter "WHC"].
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annually. 168  Mai-Tocao was recognized by ancient historians as having
tremendous significance to various cultures and is central to Aprophian and
Rantanian cultural heritage.1 69 Mai-Tocao was added to the World Heritage
List in 1988,17° reflecting the international community's recognition of its
universal value.' 7 ' Far from complying with its duty to protect the Mai-
Tocao site, 72 Aprophe breached international law by destroying one of its
buildings.
Three preliminary matters relating to attribution, standing, and
applicable international law must be addressed before considering
Aprophe's substantive violations. First, while Andler's regime is
illegitimate and cannot represent Aprophe before this Court, its
internationally wrongful acts 173 can still be attributed to Aprophe under
article 9 of the ASR 174 because Andler exercised elements of Aprophe's
governmental authority by inter alia suspending Green's policies and
dissolving parliament in the absence of the official authorities, as
Aprophe's legitimate government was illegally deposed by Andler's
coup.1
75
Additionally, Respondent has standing to invoke Aprophe's state
responsibility for Andler's destruction of cultural property, because these
acts violated rules that are binding erga omnes and owed to the
international community as a whole. 176 Therefore, under article 48 of the
ASR, Respondent may invoke Aprophe's responsibility for breaching the
erga omnes prohibition on destruction of cultural property. 1
77
Regarding the applicable legal norms, Respondent acknowledges that
Aprophe is not a signatory to several conventions applicable to this area of
law, including the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property ("Hague Convention") 7 8 and the Additional Protocols to the 1949
168. Compromis 3.
169. Id.
170. Compromis 12.
171. WHC, art.11.
172. WHC, art.4.
173. Compromis 39-42.
174. ARSIWA, art.9.
175. Compromis 27-28.
176. Separate Opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade, Request for interpretation of the Judgment
of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Order on
Provisional Measures, General List No.151 (2011), 93; WHC, preamble; Francesco Francioni, The
Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 E.J.I.L. 9, 13 (2011);
Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and
International Law, 14 E.J.I.L. 619, 634 (2003); Roger O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations
to the International Community as a Whole?, 53 I.C.L.Q. 189, 190 (2004).
177. ARSIWA, art.48(1); Barcelona Traction, 33.
178. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249
[Vol. 19:1
Distinguished Brief
Geneva Conventions ("Additional Protocol I" and "Additional Protocol
II").179  Nonetheless, all the rules forbidding the destruction of cultural
property in these treaties have been widely recognized as international
custom, including the fundamental principles of respect for cultural
property set out in article 4 of the Hague Convention'80 and the protection
of cultural objects and places of worship set out in article 53 of Additional
Protocol 1.181
A. The destruction of the building was an act of hostility directed against
cultural property
Customary international law prohibits states from making cultural
property the object of attack. 182  Andler's destruction of a Mai-Tocao
building.83 violated international law as an act of hostility directed against
cultural property, prohibited by article 4(1) of the Hague Convention.
Article 53(a) of Additional Protocol I also applies to prohibit acts of
hostility directed against Mai-Tocao, because Mai-Tocao constitutes the
"cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.' 84  This provision applies any
object "whose value transcends geographical boundaries, and which are
unique in character and are intimately associated with the history and
culture of a people."' 1 5  Mai-Tocao is such an object. The Rantanian
U.N.T.S. 240 (1954) [hereinafter "Hague Convention"].
179. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977) [hereinafter "AP I"];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1977).
180. UNESCO, General Conference 27/C/Res.3.5 (1993), preamble; Annotated Supplement to
the US Naval Handbook (1997), §5.4.2 (accepting the binding nature of the Hague Convention, even
though the U.S. is not a party); Prosecutor v. Tadi5, Decision on Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), 98; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Trial Judgment, IT-99-36-T (2004),
595 ("[i]nstitutions dedicated to religion are protected... under customary international law"); Partial
Award: Central Front, Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 22, 43 I.L.M. 1249 (2004); David Meyer, The
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11
B.U. INT'L L.J. 349 (1993).
181. Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, CHALLENGES AHEAD, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRTS
KALSHOVEN 93, 110 (Astrid Delissen & Gerard Tanja eds., 1991). A similar provision is contained in
art. 16 of Additional Protocol II.
182. Hague Convention, art.4(l); AP I, art.53(a); ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian
Law Database, rule 38B [hereinafter "ICRC, Database"].
183. Compromis 42.
184, AP I, art.53(a).
185. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. 1 (2005), 2064 [hereinafter "HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK"], cited with
approval in Prosecutor v. Kordi6 and Cerkez, Appeal Judgment, IT-95-14/2-A (2004), 91.
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president's statement in 1988, citing Mai-Tocao as part of the region's
"proudly shared history and culture,"' 86 acknowledged its importance
beyond Aprophe's borders. Mai-Tocao is also intimately associated with
the history and culture of Aprophians and Rantanians, possessing religious
significance dating thousands of years to 2000 BCE.
187
States have condemned attacks against cultural property as
contravening international humanitarian law' and banned such attacks in
their legislation. 89  The ICTY has also held individuals criminally
responsible for destroying cultural property, declaring such attacks to be
particularly serious violations of international humanitarian law.' 90
It is irrelevant that the bombing of the Mai-Tocao building did not
cause more extensive damage.' 91  International law prohibiting the
destruction of cultural property does not require a minimum threshold of
damage. 192 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind included wilful attacks on cultural property as "exceptionally
serious war crimes," without referencing any result requirement. 193  In
2007, UNESCO condemned a mortar attack of a World Heritage site in
Kosovo even though the site sustained only minor damage and no one was
wounded. 
194
186. Compromis 12.
187. Compromis 3.
188. See the practice of Cape Verde (cited in ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian
Law: Practice, Vol.11, §181); China (§183); Croatia (§185); France (§192); Germany (§194); Iran
(§202); Pakistan (§215); United Arab Emirates (§219) [hereinafter "ICRC, Practice"]; S.C. Res. 1265,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (1999), 2; G.A. Res. 47/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/147 (1992), preamble; G.A.
Res. 49/196, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/196 (1994), preamble; G.A. Res. 50/193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/193
(1995), preamble; UNESCO, General Conference 27/C/Res.4.8 (1993), 1-2; U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, Res. 1998/70 (1998), 2 (g), 5(h); UNESCO, Press Release No. 2001-27 (2001);
UNESCO, Press Release No. 2001-38 (2001) (denouncing attacks on cultural property in the former
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Korea).
189. See the legislation of Argentina (cited in ICRC, Practice, §105); Australia (§109);
Azerbaijan (§110); Bosnia and Herzegovina (§113); Bulgaria (§114); Canada (§117); Chile (§118);
China (§119); Colombia (§120); Congo (§122); Croatia (§124); Dominican Republic (§128); Estonia
(§130); Germany (§132); Italy (§135); Kyrgyzstan (§138); Mali (§142); Mexico (§143); Netherlands
(§§144-45); New Zealand (§147); Nicaragua (§148); Paraguay (§152); Peru (§153); Poland (§154);
Romania (§155); Russian Federation (§156); Slovenia (§158); Spain (§160); United Kingdom (§167);
United States (§ 168); Uruguay (§ 169); Venezuela (§ 170).
190. Prosecutor v. Jovi6, Sentencing Judgment, IT-01-42/1-S (2004), 53 [hereinafter "Jovi6"];
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, IT-01-42-T (2005).
191. Compromis 42.
192. Jovi6, 50; HENCKAERTS & DosWALD-BECK, 2070.
193. Report of the ILC on the work of its forty-third session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991),
art.22(2)(f).
194. "UNESCO condemns attack against World Heritage site in Kosovo," Kuwait News
Agency, April 6, 2007.
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1. No imperative military necessity existed to justify the building's
destruction
Since the Mai-Tocao complex constitutes the cultural and spiritual
heritage of peoples, the destruction of a building therein in violation of
article 53(a) of Additional Protocol I cannot be excused on the basis of
imperative military necessity.
Neither can Aprophe invoke the defense of imperative military
necessity contained in article 4(2) of the Hague Convention, 195 because
there is no evidence in the Compromis to show that such necessity existed.
Andler's actions were political measures intended to coerce political
decision-makers, and are not the result of a military decision to obtain a
military advantage. 196 Furthermore, imperative military necessity requires
the cultural property to have first been converted into a military objective,
and that no feasible alternative to obtain a similar military advantage
existed.' 97  Applicant bears the burden of establishing these
preconditions,' 98 which were not met. For example, military necessity does
not permit the use of cultural property as a shield from attack.' 99 The Mai-
Tocao temple also never became a military objective for Andler, as Major-
General Brewscha had already announced that ENI forces would not attack
the site.200  Thus, no military advantage would be gained from its
destruction. 21' In fact, by fleeing to Mai-Tocao to escape impending
capture by ENI forces,20 2 Andler turned Mai-Tocao into a military objective
for ENI forces by deliberately operating from within a cultural site in
violation of the customary prohibition on using cultural property for
purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage, contained in article
4(1) of the Hague Convention 20 3 and set forth in numerous military manuals
195. Hague Convention, art.4(2).
196. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 86 (2004).
197. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, 38 I.L.M. 769 (1999), art.6(a).
198. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Merits Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 15-16
(stating that the burden of proof in respect of each claim lies on the party asserting it).
199. See the military manual of Israel (cited in ICRC, Practice, §308); U.S. Department of
Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix 0: The Role of
the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 624 (1992); U.S., Manual for Military Commissions (2007), §6(10)
(criminalizing the use of protected property as a shield); O.S.C.E. Spillover Monitoring Mission to
Skopje, Press Release, Aug. 7, 2001; Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 39, 87-88 (2010).
200. Compromis 39.
201. AP I, art.52(2) (defining "military objective" as an object that makes an effective
contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage).
202. Compromis 39.
203. Hague Convention, art.4(l); ICRC, Database, rule 39.
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of states,2°4 including those not party to the Convention.205 Therefore, since
Andler made Mai-Tocao a military objective, she contributed to the
situation of necessity and thus cannot rely upon the exception.2 °6
B. The destruction of the Mai-Tocao building was an illegal act of reprisal
Reprisals are acts of self-help committed in response to a perceived
violation of international law to compel the offending state to cease its
actions.20 7  Andler destroyed a building in Mai-Tocao to stop what she
characterized as the ENI's "unlawful military operation.,' 20 8 Therefore, that
destruction constitutes a reprisal against cultural property, prohibited in
customary rules described in the Hague Convention and Additional
Protocol 1.209 This prohibition is accepted throughout the international
community, including by states not party to the Hague Convention.21'
Therefore, Andler's act of reprisal violates the prohibition on reprisals
against cultural property, which does not permit any military necessity
exception.
204. See the military manuals of Argentina (cited in ICRC, Practice, §301); Australia (§302);
Canada (§§303-4); Croatia (§305); Germany (§§306-7); Israel (§308); Italy (§§309-10); Netherlands
(§§312-13); Nigeria (§316); Russian Federation (§317); South Africa (§318); Spain (§319); Sweden
(§320); Switzerland (§§321-22).
205. See the military manuals of Kenya (cited in id., §311); New Zealand (§314); United States
(§324-29).
206. ARSIWA, art.25; Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 52.
207. BROWNLIE, 466; PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 351 (7th ed. 1997); SHAw, 1023.
208. Compromis 40.
209. Hague Convention, art.4(4); AP I, art.53(c); ICRC, Database, rule 147.
210. See the practice of Argentina (cited in ICRC, Practice, §§960, 991); Australia (§§961-62);
Azerbaijan (§992); Belgium (§963); Burkina Faso (§965); Cameroon (§966); Canada (§967); Colombia
(§993); Congo (§968); Croatia (§969); France (§§970-71); Germany (§§972-74); Hungary (§975);
Indonesia (§976); Italy (§§977, 994); Netherlands (§§979-80); New Zealand (§981); Spain (§§982,
995); Sweden (§983); Switzerland (§§984, 996).
211. See the practice of Benin (cited in id, §964); Kenya (§978); Togo (§985); United States
(§§987-989).
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Federal Republic of Rantania respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The Andler regime and its representatives appear in the name of
the Republic of Aprophe before this Court, and thus the Court has
no jurisdiction over the Applicant's claims.
2. The use of force against Aprophe in the context of Operation
Uniting for Democracy is not attributable to Rantania, and in any
event, that use of force was not illegal.
3. The exercise of jurisdiction by Rantanian courts in the case of
Turbando, et al., v. The Republic of Aprophe was consistent with
International Law, and therefore Rantanian officials may execute
the judgment in that case.
4. Aprophe violated International Law by destroying a building of
the Temple of Mai-Tocao.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Rantania
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Acquisitions & Serials
International Law Weekend saw the intersection of esteemed
scholars, students, attorneys, and activists engaged in thought-
provoking discussion. The ILSA Journal of International &
Comparative Law left New York City just before the arrival of
Hurricane Sandy, finding ourselves discussing NGO's, metadata,
piracy, mining, crimes of sexual violence and degradation, the rise
and fall of nations, and collective, global rights for the disabled.
These panels were remarkable, and those who conducted the
panels even more impressive. This edition focuses on individuals
who have made it their life's work to further our understanding of
how the law and humanity are inseparable. We are forced to hear the
voices of the oppressed, and this collective body of work should
enhance our readership's understanding of how creativity and cultural
immersion can bring about discussion-and that discussion might
effectuate meaningful change. As mentioned above, Hurricane
Sandy touched-down on the Tri-State area as our members and many
of the panelists were taking-off, away from the storm. As such, we
dedicate this edition to those who were affected by Sandy, its
aftermath, and our hope for their recovery.
There are innumerable people to thank for this International
Practitioner's Notebook, Volume 19:2. To begin with, we thank the
authors, many of whom mediated or participated in panel discussions
with topics ranging from Persons with Disabilities to explaining the
Ad Hoc Tribunals for those victims of sexual violence during
wartime. These articles are often difficult to read in so far as they
are not redacted for their disturbing content. However, they reflect
the reality of the world in which we live. My hope is that the
readership finds the work as important as our staff did in our
selection of these pieces.
I would like to personally thank Vivian Shen from the ILSA
National Office. She was our guide towards publication and access
to authors. Next, ABILA, we thank you for working with ILSA to
bring an eclectic, worldwide crowd together for a special weekend.
These two organizations share a collective bond to educate and
engage those who have the privilege of attending ILW weekend.
I would like to thank the ILSA Journal's faculty advisers at the
Shepard Broad Law Center, Professors Roma Perez and Doug
Donoho. Their commitment to education and scholarship is much
appreciated. My own staff, from Junior Staffers to our Executive
Board, thank you for your late nights, persistence, and precision. It
was an honor to do great work with you.
Finally, I would like to thank my own family for their support
and love. My hope is that our readership is as moved as I was by
these contributions.
Todd Wise, Editor-in-Chief, 2012-2013
